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ABSTRACT
Is there any relationship between the increases in economic crimes in Japan and a
great accounting fraud occurrence in Japan？ This study focuses on why forensic account-
ing should be needed in Japan, and what is the significance of forensic accounting education
in Japan. In order to clarify the reasons, I set up two hypotheses and test those hypotheses,
and provide implications based on the results. I document that the inconsistent results re-
garding the improvement of earnings quality are from the differences in an internal controls
system between an indirect reporting and a direct reporting. And, following Seda and
Kramers（２０１４）, I find that there are no face-to-face forensic accounting courses in Japan.
Following the fraud triangle（Cressey１９５３）, when incentive, opportunity, and rationalization
coexist, accounting fraud occurred. The cultivation of forensic accounting education to de-
tect and investigate fraud would help managers to encourage their internal controls to work
well. Also, the existence of forensic accountants who confront fraud might be a checks-and-
balance function against incentives and rationalization that a manager transfers his or her
subjective incentive into social and universal significance.
Keywords: Forensic Accounting; Fraud; the Fraud Triangle; Internal Controls Auditing; Indi-
rect Reporting
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FIGURE１: Economic Crime in the World（Global Economic Crime ２０１６Survey）
Note: Based on the Table１of PwC（２０１７,６）Japan, I prepare this figure.
１ INTRODUCTION
The number of economic crime occurrences reported increased from１５% to２３% in
Japan while the number of economic crime occurrences reported in the world decreased
from３７% to３６%, that is decreased by１% from２０１４（PwC２０１７,６）. Figure１ indicates the
changes in economic crime between２０１４and２０１６following PwC survey２０１６. According to
PwC ２０１６ Global Crime Survey（PwC ２０１６）and the Analysis in Japan（PwC ２０１７, １０）, re-
ported losses between $１ million and $１００ million in the world decreased from ２６% to ２２%
（FY２０１６）and reported losses in excess of $１００million in the world decreased from２０% to
１４%（FY２０１６）, while reported losses between $１million and $１００million increased from３６
% to３９%（FY２０１６）and reported losses in excess of $１００million increased from１８% to ２３
%（FY２０１６）in Japan.１
１ The financial damage loss by economic crime shows１３% of respondents suffered losses between $１million
and $１００million and１% of respondents reported losses in excess of $１００million,３９% of respondents suffered
losses between $１ million and $１００ million and ２３% of respondents reported losses in excess of $１００ million
and that means５% increases from FY２０１４in Japan（PwC２０１７,１０）.
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Are the increases in economic crimes in Japan and a great accounting fraud occur-
rence in Japan accidentally matched? Is there any relationship between the current state of
economic crime in the world and Japan, and the accounting fraud occurrence at Toshiba in
Japan? This study focuses on why forensic accounting is needed in Japan, and what is the
significance of forensic accounting education in Japan. In order to clarify the reasons why fo-
rensic accounting is necessary in Japan and the significance of forensic accounting educa-
tion, I set up two hypotheses and test those hypotheses, and provide implications based on
the results.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, this study is
the first study to clarify the need of forensic accounting in Japan by providing evidence in
international perspective. Second, this study helps educators to recognize that the develop-
ment of their accounting programs to include a forensic accounting course is an urgent task
through providing a current situation of forensic accounting education in the world.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows; Section ２ develops hypotheses.
Section ３ describes the research design. Section ４ discusses the results. The final section
provides implications and concludes this study.
２BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants（２００７, para ３.２, ３）pre-
scribes that the internal control audit is the Internal Control Report prepared by manage-
ment, and external auditors should express their opinions, as to whether management’s In-
ternal Control Report fairly states the results of the assessment of the effectiveness of inter-
nal control in all material respects, in accordance with generally accepted assessment stan-
dards for internal control. Business Accounting Council（２００７）prescribes CPA’s Audit on
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting as follows:
Managerial assessments on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting are as-
sured by certified public accountants responsible for auditing the financial statements of the
company in question（hereafter referred as“auditor（s）”）by auditing whether the result of as-
sessments are fairly stated on the Internal Control Report）.
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Auditors should understand the company’s context obtain a sufficient understanding of the
management’s assessment of design and operation of internal control and organize audits, pay-
ing attention to the materiality of the audit. As the auditors audit the results of the manage-
ment’s assessment of internal controls, they shall first examine the appropriateness. Of the
scope of assessment as determined by the management and then examine the management’s
assessment of company-level controls and the assessment of process-level controls performed
by the management based on the result of assessments of company-level controls. The auditor
shall prepare the ’Internal Control Audit Report and express an opinion on the management’s
assessment on the effectiveness of Internal controls over financial reporting（Business Account-
ing Council２００７,５―６）.
In order to avoid the burden of excessive cost in the assessment of internal control
and the audit, the Committee decided to adopt indirect reporting. Direct reporting refers to
the process whereby external auditors express their opinions directly on the effectiveness of
the internal control over financial reporting of listed companies（Business Accounting Coun-
cil ２００７）. External auditors are required to“express their opinions, as to whether the man-
agement’s Internal Control Report fairly states the results of the assessment, in all material
respects.”In other words, external auditors should basically obtain appropriate audit evi-
dence by conducting tests using samples they select. However, external auditors are allowed
to utilize a portion of the samples selected by management in their assessment, considering
the validity of the samples and by examining some of the results derived using the manage-
ment’s test（JICPA２００７, para３.２,３）.
In the early１９８０s, external auditors used to investigate a firms’records（Crumbley
et al.２０１７,４―２）. As the computerization of firms was developed and the number of transac-
tions increased, auditors shifted to reduce the labor-intensive process of the accounts and re-
lied on the firms’internal controls. This allowed the auditors to do less work on account bal-
ances and transactions（Brown ２００２, C１）. Managers can organize their internal controls,
they were able to manipulate the records. Due to the inherent limitations of internal con-
trols, a fraud committed by a CEO will not be detected by the client’s internal control sys-
tem（Cullinan and Sutton ２００２）. This lead the great accounting fraud, such as Enron and
WorldCom in the U.S.（Brown ２００２, C１）. Thus, SOX required external auditors to review
the internal controls directly.
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Japan needed to learn the history in the pre-SOX and why SOX was enacted in the
U.S. External auditors relied on the client’s internal controls, which managers can manipu-
lated. This lead accounting fraud in the U.S. As a matter of course, direct reporting was ap-
plied in the SOX in the U.S. in order for external auditors to investigate a firm’s books by
themselves. The direct reporting should have been applied in the J-SOX in Japan if we
learned the lesson from the U.S. results.
Cressey’s（１９５３）theory means that when incentives／pressure, opportunity, and ra-
tionalization coexist, fraud occurs. The three risk factors of the fraud triangle are related to
fraudulent financial statements.２ Pressure is the degree to which the person in authority has
the motivation to commit fraud. Opportunity is the degree to which conditions are such that
fraud could be committed due to feasible governance or ineffective internal control systems.
Rationalization is the rationale that a manager transfers his or her subjective decisions to so-
cial and universal significance in order to justify his or her misuses or mistakes（Nakashima
２０１７b）.
Japanese regulation for internal controls（J-SOX）３ requires managers of public
firms in Japan to design their internal control systems and to assess the effectiveness of the
internal controls（FSA ２００７）. This indirect reporting system does not allow external audi-
tors to audit whether their internal control systems work effectively or not.
This indirect reporting system makes external auditors to review whether the
evaluation of the effectiveness of internal controls system by managers is stated fairly based
on so-called“the three-piece set”４ for the evaluation of operational processes that managers
set up（FSA２０１１b,１７, Question３２: preparation of the three-piece set, Practical Standard II３
２ Nakashima（２０１７b）examines whether the effectiveness of the fraud triangle should be clarified through
this analysis. The fraud triangle is a framework for the occurrence of fraud, developed by a criminologist,
Cressey（１９５３）. The fraud diamond was mentioned in Wolfe and Hermanson（２００４）by adding capability to
the three factors of the fraud triangle.
３ The Internal Control Regulation was enacted in Japan after accounting scandals, as well as the U.S. SOX
was enacted in the U.S after accounting scandals, Enron and WorldCom. The Japanese regulation denotes the
Standard for Assessment and Audit for Internal Control over Financial Reporting from the following site:
http:／／www.fsa.go.jp／en／news／２００７／２００７０４２０.pdf. Although this standard is not a simple Japanese version of
SOX, since media in Japan calls it J-SOX, the terminology of J-SOX for the internal controls reporting regula-
tion in Japan is used in this study.
４ FSA（２０１１a,１７, Practical Standard II３）illustrate that managers should prepare the three-piece set that cov-
ers a flowchart of operation, a description of operation，and a reaction for risk and controls in order to evalu-
ate the operational process.
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and ２９）. According to the Council Opinion（FSA ２０１１a, ２９）, since the direct reporting sys-
tem is not applied in Japan, the range for the review and the points of the controls for the
target of an evaluation by external auditors should be consistent with those by managers.
Therefore, external auditors should not originally review the points of the controls that man-
agers do not make as a range（FSA２０１１b,２９, Question４９: No application of Direct Reporting）
Through the indirect reporting system it is difficult for stakeholders and users to
know whether the firm’s internal controls system is effective or not. Also, if the three-piece
set is manipulated by unfaithful managers, it is likely that it is hard for external auditors to
detect fraud based in the process of auditing based on the three-piece set.
Since the indirect or direct reporting is one of the most focused differences in the
internal control reporting regulation between the U.S. and Japan, there is an interest of re-
searchers in the attitudes or ideas of CFOs of the public firms regarding the indirect or di-
rect reporting. Suda et al.（２０１１a; ２０１１b）asked the CFOs of the U.S. firms and the presi-
dents of the Japanese firms whether the direct reporting is effective for internal controls
and corporate governance. They suggested that５７．３% of the U.S. firms and ３７．５% of Japa-
nese firms that they evaluated the direct reporting as effective. They noted that it is signifi-
cant that approximately ６０% of the U.S. firms which adopted direct reporting in practices
evaluated the direct reporting as effective（Suda et al.２０１１a;２０１１b）.
As managers in the U.S. firms showed that the direct reporting is effective for their
internal controls, I predict that J-SOX’s indirect reporting system might have led to the fea-
sible internal control system in the post-J-SOX and resulted in that internal controls did not
work well as a restraint of accounting fraud. Therefore, I set up the following hypothesis:
H１: Accounting fraud occurrence in Japan was due to the feasible internal controls systems
that resulted from the indirect reporting in Japan.
Although there was limited forensic accounting available during the １９９０s in the
U.S., as the demand grows for professionals with forensic accounting skills due to increases
in accounting fraud, the number of colleges and universities that offer certificate programs
and master’s degrees has been increasing during the ２０００s in the U.S.（Seda and Kramer
２００８,１）. CPAs have neither the training nor the experience to tackle fraud examination and
forensic accounting investigation（Seda and Kramer ２００８, １）. Accounting students need
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fraud-specific education in order to fight against fraud（Seda and Kramer,２００８,１）. Thus, fo-
rensic accounting education to fight fraud should be provided to students as the accounting
environment is changing and the demand for it is growing in Japan.
Russell et al.（２０００,５）assert the changes in accounting education are needed along
with environmental changes and demands as the following:
Accounting educators have been warned many times that accounting education must change
to maintain relevancy, retain its position within the profession, and add value to students and
business. The time to change just to be better is past. In fact, we must transform our educa-
tional programs merely to survive. Failure to embrace market-based changes will continue to
decrease the relevance of accounting education（Russell et. al２０００,５）.
Rezaee et al.（２００４）conducted a survey of both academicians and practitioners re-
garding the significance and relevance of forensic accounting education. They asked respon-
dents to rank the importance of perceived benefits of forensic accounting education. Rezaee
et al.（２００４, １１）suggested that academicians considered the benefits of forensic accounting
education the following reasons: strengthening the credibility of financial reporting; promot-
ing responsible corporate governance; increasing the demand for individuals possessing fo-
rensic accounting education and skills; preparing students to engage in fraud examination;
making students more desirable in the marketplace; and satisfying society’s demand for fo-
rensic accounting education and practice. The benefits of forensic accounting education as
“preparing students to engage in litigation consulting and expert witnessing”is a significant
difference between academicians and practitioners. Figure２ shows that the perceived bene-
fits of forensic accounting for academicians and practitioners respectively.
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FIGURE２: Perceived Benefits of Forensic Accounting Education
Note: This figure is prepared by the autor following Rezaee et al.（２００４）, Table４.
If at least one of these factors of the fraud triangle is restrained in a given situation,
it would be highly likely that no fraud occurs. If forensic accounting courses were offered,
people could have more chances to learn fraud theory, managerial ethics and business ethics
systematically and theoretically in Japan. It seems that the managerial ethics restrains the
motivation and the rationalization by managers, thus there might be no occurrence of fraud.
However, I predict that since there are no colleges and universities that offer forensic ac-
counting courses in Japan that can offer managerial ethics and fraud theory, it seemed that
a great accounting fraud occurred in Japan. Therefore, I set up the following hypothesis:
H２: Accounting fraud occurrence in Japan is due to no face-to-face forensic accounting
education in Japan.
３ RESEARCH DESIGN
３.１ Test of Hypotheses
I conduct a meta-analysis in order to test H１. I discuss how the direct reporting or
indirect reporting for the auditing of the internal controls system impacted on earnings qual-
ity in the post Internal Control Regulation by reviewing literature in the U.S., Mexico, Ger-
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many, and Japan. The U.S., Mexico, and Germany have the direct reporting systems that as-
sess internal controls by outside auditors. On the other hand, the indirect reporting that Ja-
pan introduced is the auditing of internal controls that assesses whether managerial assess-
ment of the effectiveness of the internal controls system is stated fairly. I explore whether
differences in the results of the archival studies for each country can reveal which reporting
systems for the internal controls would work or not.
In order to test H２, I review the results of a previous study regarding forensic ac-
counting education（Seda and Kramer２０１４）and a website found by searching for the key-
word“forensic accounting in Japan.”I clarify how forensic education situation proceeds in
Japan from a global perspective.
４RESULTS
４.１. Results of Testing H１: Direct or Indirect Reporting and the Post-SOX Impact on Earn-
ings Quality
I review the previous studies regarding direct or indirect reporting: the auditing of
internal controls in the U.S., Germany, Mexico, and Japan, and the impacts of earnings qual-
ity by the internal controls regulations in order to test H１.
United States
There are several studies that have been conducted on the impacts of SOX on
earnings quality in the U.S.（Lobo and Zhou２００６; Bedard２００６; Cohen et al. ２００８）. Cohen et
al.（２００８）examined whether managers changed their earnings management in the post-
SOX periods, focusing on accruals management and real management. They documented
that although accrual-based management decreased significantly, real management in-
creased significantly in the post-SOX period and that the decreases in accrual-based earn-
ings management are because of the increased vigilance of investors, auditors and regula-
tors, and managers’greater care taken in financial reporting after the adverse publicity
caused by the fraud.
Lobo and Zhou（２００６）examined whether managers’earning management changed
in the post-SOX periods. They documented that firms reported lower discretionary accruals
after SOX, and found that firms incorporated losses more quickly than gains in the post-
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SOX period. This suggested an increase in conservatism in financial reporting following
SOX. Bedard（２００６）documented that the absolute level of unexpected accruals as a proxy
of earnings quality increased in the year internal control weaknesses are disclosed. She sug-
gested that managers reversed prior amount of accruals that were great in the internal con-
trol weaknesses disclosure year that led an increase in the earnings quality. Her result sug-
gested that because of the Section４０４ formal internal control assessment process, firms im-
proved their internal controls system. This means that SOX internal control requirements
resulted in an improved earning quality.
Mexico
It is important for shareholders to be informed of any defined processes by which
the firm operates, and to know that the firm has an orderly process of management and a
satisfactory control over the firm’s assets. Reports issued by external and internal auditors
can provide support in this regard, by verifying the effectiveness of the control systems.
The mechanism designed to support the Board in its auditing functions should evaluate the
effectiveness of the internal control systems and issue an opinion on existing financial and
operational controls. External auditors should validate the effectiveness of the internal con-
trol system and issue a report on these controls（Bolsa Mexicana De Valores２００６）.
Machuga and Teitel（２００７）examined whether Mexican internal control regulation
improved earnings quality using two samples of Mexican local firms in Mexico and Mexican
firms listed on the U.S. stock exchange and documented an improvement in income smooth-
ing and timely loss recognition for both samples, Mexican local firms in Mexico and Mexican
firms listed on the U.S. Stock exchange.
Germany
KonTraG（１９９８）prescribes that external auditors must assess management’s im-
plementation of a suitable ICRM system（§３１７ IV HGB）, and evaluate and report on the
system’s effectiveness（§３２１IV HGB）. Brown et al.（２０１３）documented that earnings qual-
ity, such as timely loss recognition and earnings smoothness, improved after the German
legislation on control and transparency by using a sample of the public firms in Germany.
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Japan
After accounting scandals such as Kanebo and Seibu Tetsudo, Internal control
regulation（J-SOX）５ was enacted in ２００８. Council Opinion（FSA ２００７, ５）prescribes the
auditing on Internal Control over Financial Reporting as follows:
Managerial assessments on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting are as-
sured by certified public accountants responsible for auditing the financial statements of the
company in question（hereafter, referred as“auditor（s）”）by auditing whether the result of as-
sessments are fairly stated（in the Internal Control Report）.
J-SOX does not adopt the direct reporting by external auditors due to concerns of
public firms paying higher audit fees. J-SOX’s indirect reporting means that external audi-
tors do not audit the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting directly.
Nakashima（２０１０）examined whether managers had changed their earnings man-
agement in the post-internal controls regulations in Japan. While accruals management and
real management had a trade-off in the post-SOX in the U.S.（Cohen et al. ２００８）, earnings
management remained unchanged in Japan in the post-J-SOX（Nakashima and Ziebart
２０１５）. Nakashima and Ziebart（２０１５）suggested that the inconsistent results in Japan with
the U.S. may have been from the deficiency of governance mechanism６ and the feasible in-
ternal controls systems.
Thus, Table １ shows that while earnings quality improved after the internal con-
trols regulations in the U.S., Mexico, and Germany that adopted the direct reporting, earn-
ings quality remained unchanged in Japan which did not adopt the direct reporting in the
post-J-SOX. This suggests that it is likely that the indirect reporting of J-SOX does not work
well. Thus, it seems that accounting fraud occurrence in Japan was due to the feasible inter-
nal controls systems that resulted from the indirect reporting in Japan. The result supports
５ The Standard for Assessment and Audit for Internal Control over Financial Reporting（http:／／www.fsa.go.
jp／en／news／２００７／２００７０４２０.pdf.）was enacted in２００８. Although this is not an exact Japanese version of SOX,
the terminology of J-SOX is generally used in Japan after media used the internal controls and reporting
regulation as J-SOX. Therefore, the terminology of J-SOX for the regulation is used in this paper.
６ Beasley（１９９６）and Nakashima（２０１７a）suggested that financial statement fraud was associated with inef-
fective inner governance mechanism. This study can provide a comprehensive model that includes not only
financial ratios but also governance information for predicting fraudulent financial statements. Nakashima
（２０１７a）documented that there is a possible relationship between fraud and governance mechanism.
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TABLE１: Direct or Indirect Reorting System and the Impact on Earnings Quality
Country／Internal
Control Audits Authors Proxy Earnings Quality Indicator Findings
US／Direct
Reporting
Lobo and
Zhou
（２００６）
Changes in man-
agers’ earnings
management as
Financial Report-
ing Quality
Discretionary Accruals and conseratism
following Basu’s（１９９７）model
Firms showed lower discretionary ac-
cruals and higher conservatism in the
post-SOX.
US／Direct
Reporting
Bedard
（２００６）
Unexpected total
and current ac-
cruals
Unexpected total and current accrualss
A decrease in the magnitude of unex-
pected accruals in the year of their
first report.
US／Direct
Reporting
Cohen
et al.
（２００８）
Earnings quality
Accrual-based earnings management in-
creased steadily from １９８７ until the pas-
sage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act（SOX）in
２００２, followed by a significant decline af-
ter the passage of SOX. Conversely, the
level of real earnings management activi-
ties
Accrual-based earnings management in-
creased steadily from １９８７ until the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
（SOX）in２００２, followed by a significant
decline after the passage of SOX.
Mexico／Direct
Reporting
Machuga
and Teitel
（２００７）
Earnings quality ｜NI｜／｜OCF｜, timely loss recognistion,abnormal accruals
Earnings quality increases after the im-
plementation of the Code. While most
earnings quality proxies improve for
firms listed on the Mexican Bolsa, only
improvements in income smoothing
and timely loss recognition for Mexican
firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges.
Germany／Direct
Reporting
Brown
et al.
（２０１３）
Earnings quality
Based on Basu（１９９７）, timely loss recog-
nition and as earnings smoothness,｜NI
｜／｜OCF｜and Correlation between
accruals and OCF, As predicatability,
OCF t＋１
German firms experience an increase
in timely loss recognition and a de-
crease in earnings smoothing after
KTG. We
US／Direct
Reporting
Nakashima
（２０１０） Earnings quality
Accruals earnings, discretionary accruals
and accuracy for cash flows
Accruals earnings, discretionary accru-
als and accuracy for cash flows im-
proved in the post-SOX.
JAPAN／Indirect
Reproitng
Nakashima
（２０１５） Earnings quality
Accruals earnings, discretionary accruals
and accuracy for cash flows
Accruals earnings, discretionary accru-
als remained unchanged and accuracy
for cash flows improved in the post-J-
SOX.
H１.
４.２. The Results of Testing H２: No Forensic Accounting Education and Fraud Occurrence
Since forensic accounting education is not cultivated in Japan, there have been no
chances to learn the theory of fraud and skills to detect fraud systematically. In order to ex-
amine whether there is a relationship between the existence of forensic accounting educa-
tion and fraud occurrence, I examine the availability of forensic accounting education in the
world.
Figure３ shows the availability of forensic accounting education in the U.S. and the
world. Figure４presents that among twenty five foreign countries, there are no colleges and
universities that offer separate forensic accounting courses in Japan. Figure ４ also shows
that among twenty three foreign countries, there are no colleges that offer forensic account-
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FIGURE３: The Availabitliy of Forensic Accounting Education: the U.S. and the World
Note: Based on the Table１of Seda and Kramer（２０１４,１２）, I prepare this figure.
FIGURE４: Colleges Offering Separate Forensic Accounting Courses
outside the U.S.
Note: Based on the Table２A of Seda and Kramer（２０１４,２５―２６）, this fig-
ure is prepared by author.
ing certificates and degree programs in Japan. Figure ５ presents that among nine foreign
countries, there are no colleges that offer forensic accounting concentration in Japan.
It seems that more forensic accounting courses are taught in English speaking
countries. This suggests that they have an influence by the U.S. education. However, even
though Japan is one of the developed countries and might have an impact from the U.S., sur-
prisingly there are no forensic accounting courses, programs, or degrees in Japan.
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FIGURE５: Colleges Offering Forensic Accounting Certificate and Degree
Program Outside the U.S.
Note: Based on the Table３A of Seda and Kramer（２０１４. ３４―３６）, I prepared
this figure.
I searched the keywords“forensic accounting course in Japan”and“forensic ac-
counting course”in Japanese on the Internet. Table ２ shows that there are eight universi-
ties that offer forensic accounting courses through on-line by the U.S. colleges in Japan. The
on-line courses are offered in English and it seems that the forensic accounting education is
suitable for the U.S. environment. If we cultivate forensic accounting education in Japan, we
should adjust the original forensic accounting in the U.S. in order to match the education to
the Japanese environment, since there are differences in the internal controls auditing, law
enforcement, and legal systems.
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TABLE２: Online Program of Forensic Accounting Courses Offering in Japan
Name of School
Location
of School
Degree
Utica College NY, US MBA in Economic Crime and Fraud Management
Southern New Hampshire
University
NW, US MS in Accounting - Forensic Accounting
Kaplan University FL, US M．S．in Accounting - Audit Specialization
Neumann University PA, US
Master of Science in Accounting with emphasis on
Forensics and Fraud Detection
Western New
England University
MA, US
MS in Accounting with a concentration in Foren-
sic Accounting／Fraud Investigation
Florida Atlantic
University
FL, US
Executive Masters of Accounting in Forensic Ac-
counting．
Jones International
University
CO, US MBA in Forensic Accounting
Keiser University FL, US
Master of Accountancy with concentrations in
General Accounting and Forensic Accounting
Note: The above programs are the programs that came up with“forensic accounting pro-
gram in Japan.”
There are no colleges and universities that offer no face-to-face forensic accounting
courses in Japan.７ The fact that no forensic accounting education are offered suggests that
since there is no chance to learn managerial ethics and the fraud theory, such a situation
cannot restrain incentive and rationalization by managers. Thus, it is likely that there is a
possibility that education with no fraud theory leads to the occurrence of fraud in Japan.
The result supports H２.
５ IMPLICATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study focuses on the reasons why forensic accounting is needed in Japan, and
what is the significance of forensic accounting education in Japan by testing the hypotheses
７ Forensic accounting course opened as one course of master program at Graduate School of Accounting
and Finance, Chiba University of Commerce, in Fall ２０１７. Also, forensic accounting is supposed to be taught
at Hosei University in Fall２０１８.
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and providing implications based on the results.
First, I document that by showing the inconsistent results regarding the improve-
ment of earnings quality are from the differences in an internal controls system between an
indirect reporting system and a direct reporting system. It seems that accounting fraud oc-
currence in Japan was due to the feasible internal controls systems that resulted from the
indirect reporting in Japan.
Second, following the review of Seda and Kramer（２０１４）and the search of website,
I found that there are no face-to-face forensic accounting courses in Japan. The fact that no
forensic accounting education are offered suggests that since there is no chance to learn
managerial ethics and the fraud theory, such a situation cannot restrain incentive and ra-
tionalization by managers. Thus, it is likely that there is a possibility that education with no
fraud theory leads to the occurrence of fraud in Japan.
I provide implication from my study: In order to have no accounting fraud business
society, if Japan keeps the indirect reporting system for internal control auditing, it should
provide accounting students with knowledge of forensic accounting and forensic skills to
prevent, detect, and investigate fraud and educate them to be professional forensic account-
ants. In other words, it is time in Japan to provide students with knowledge about fraud and
fraud theory, and the forensic skills to prevent, detect and investigate fraud.
The existence of forensic accountants in business society would encourage manag-
ers to organize the firms’internal controls systems better and would act as a restraint of
the two factors of incentive and rationalization by a manager. Therefore, forensic accounting
education and the existence of forensic accountants would help develop a no fraud busi-
nesses society.
This study has limitations: I should have implemented archival studies regarding
whether there is an association between the auditing for internal control systems and the
improvement in earnings quality by the same proxies for the countries of the U.S., Mexico,
Germany, and Japan.
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